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Abstract
ABSTRACT: We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare.
We ﬁnd that skill-neutral policies are never optimal. An egalitarian welfare
function induces a policy that entails moving mainly unskilled immigrants into
the rich countries, whereas a welfare function skewed highly towards the rich
countries induces an optimal policy that entails a brain-drain from the poor
countries. For intermediate welfare functions that moderately favor the rich
however, it is optimal to have no migration at all.
1 Introduction
All rich industrialized countries severely restrict immigration.1 While the extent of
the restrictions varies by country and by period, they nevertheless are at odds with the
basic tenets of free trade, and in deep contradiction with some of the most cherished
values of liberal democracy: that there should be no job discrimination based on
nationality, ethnicity, race or gender. While we deplore job discrimination directed
at citizens, we also design immigration laws that exclude foreign nationals out of our
countries and our job market.2 It follows that there must be costs associated with
immigrants that are borne by the citizens of a country, or otherwise the borders would
be open.
Several reasons may be given to explain restrictive immigration policies in terms
of the costs that immigrants impose on the citizens of a country. The most obvious is
∗We thank the NSF for support and Matthias Kredler for doing all the calibrations and producing
the associated plots.
†Both authors are at New York University
1Freedberg and Hunt (1995) report that all but 100 million of the world’s 6 billion people live in
the country of their birth.
2Protectionist arguments have recently been made against the mobility of capital, on the grounds
that some multinational corporations do not pay a “living wage” in third world countries. Yet none
of the pundits against outsourcing has advocated opening up of the borders to immigrants in order
to improve their lot.
1a distributional argument cast in terms of political economy. The median voter whose
income derives mostly from wages will wish to keep out the unskilled immigrants who
will depress his wage.3 Others, more controversially, stress the cost of social services
that low-skilled immigrants impose on the citizens, or adopt the communitarian view
that shared values, customs and culture constitute a social good that would be diluted
by immigration, an argument that has often been used to keep the undesirables out.4
Finally, one can argue that positive output externalities emanating from the average
level of human capital will be depressed by immigrants with low human capital stocks
who cause congestion, disutility, and have a negative impact on output per capita.
Since the goal of this paper is not to identify the nature and scope of the costs of
immigration borne by citizens, we will model the latter explanation by externalities
emanating from the average level of human capital, a framework which is quite simple,
and which may be modiﬁed or reinterpreted to capture direct labor-market eﬀects on
wages, or negative cultural externalities from low skilled immigrants.
We study the welfare implications of restrictive immigration policies from the
world perspective, while allowing for costs of migration to the host and source coun-
tries. We ask what the optimal immigration policy would be, given a social welfare
function that parametrically weighs the citizens of the industrialized, human-capital-
rich countries and those of the third world. One might simply expect that as the
welfare weight is continuously shifted from the citizens of the ﬁrst to the third world,
optimal immigration policy, in terms of the proportion of third world citizens al-
lowed to emigrate, would increase continuously. Our results indicate that this is not
so: if populations are homogeneous in the skills within a country but diﬀer across
countries, there is a threshold relative welfare weight assigned to the third world cit-
izens at which optimal immigration policy shifts from zero immigration to maximal
immigration. If populations are heterogenous in skill to labor ratios, then under egal-
itarian social welfare weights, or, a fortiori, with weights that favor natives of the low
average skill country, the optimal policy is to let the least skilled emigrate, up to a
threshold skill level, from the low to the high average skill country. A simple and
quick calibration shows that this implies that optimally up to 3.2 billion low-skilled
people should emigrate from the third world to the OECD.5 If on the other hand,
social welfare weights favor the natives of the high-skill country, optimal immigration
policy may be no immigration at all, or an immigration policy that allows only the
highly skilled to emigrate from the low- to the high-average-skill country.
3See for example Borjas(2003), and Borjas and Katz (2005). For the opposing view see Card
(2005). For a more recent reconsideration of this debate, see Peri and Ottaviano (2006).
4See the edited volume by Warren F. Schwartz (1995), and in particular the essays in the vol-
ume by Jules Coleman and Sarah Harding, and by Michael Trebilcock. For studies suggesting that
immigrants do not impose large negative social externalities see National Research Council (1997)
and Butcher and Piehl (1998).
5The International Organization for Migration estimates that currently there are 191
million transnational migrants worldwide comprising 3% of the global population. See
http://www.iom.int/jahia/page254.html
2With globalization, pressures to design redistributive and immigration policies
that increasingly take a world rather than national perspective are likely to mount.
Thus, if the political perspective shifts from a national to an international one, more
consistent with values of liberal democracy applied globally, the optimal immigration
policy will require a drastic change. Of course other factors, including political costs of
policy transition, or political resistance in host countries, may imply a more gradual
shift over time. This paper, while allowing for the costs of immigration, shows a
basic thrust or tendency calling for a shift in immigration policy as we move towards
a world democracy.
2T h e M o d e l
Immigrants in our model aﬀect the well-being of the residents of the host country
through a group eﬀect. This group eﬀect operates through the eﬀect that immigrants
have on “social capital,” originally discussed by Coleman (1988)6.W ed e ﬁne “social
capital” as human capital per person, ¯ h, which raises the marginal productivity of
human capital h, and we formalize it as in Lucas (1988):
Marginal product of human capital = G
¡¯ h
¢
where G0 > 0 and G00 < 0. We drop the second factor (physical capital) and assume





where H is the total human capital in the country. Evidence supporting this formu-
lation is given by Clark (1987), who attributes G
¡¯ h
¢
to culture in a multinational
setting, and by Rauch (1993) who attributes it to human-capital spillovers at the
level of “Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas”. Thus if immigrants decrease the
average level of human capital, they depress marginal products, wages and average
productivity.7
A second, non-market interpretation of G, is one of a cultural externality operating
not through production, but through preferences of natives. That is, since agents’




as an externality acting directly on utility, reﬂecting a cultural distaste for
unskilled immigrants, so that the enjoyment of consumption is diluted in a society
6Coleman (1988) describes social capital as falling into three categories: (a) mutual obligations
and expectations, (b) social norms (c) information channels and their role in the creation of human
capital. The ﬁrst two may be part of culture.
7Recent evidence on externalities of schooling in the U.S. is mixed. Moretti (2004) ﬁnds a positive
external eﬀect from an increase of college graduates in U.S. cities for 1980-1990, while Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant externalities from changes in
average schooling for U.S. states over the period 1960-1990. More recently Peri and Iranzo (2006)
ﬁnd positive externalities from the share of college graduates.
3where the arrival of less skilled immigrants lowers ¯ h. In this sense, culture is a public
good that is diminished by the arrival of unskilled immigrants, but enriched by highly
skilled immigrants, so that it is not simply xenophobia.8
Constant returns and decentralizability.–The production function (1) obeys con-
stant returns to scale in the sense that doubling the number of residents while leaving
the distribution of individual human capital h unchanged leaves ¯ h unaﬀected, but
doubles H and, hence, Y. This allows for a competitive situation in which zero-proﬁt




Eﬃciency vs. distribution.–The model has a tension between considerations of
eﬃciency and distribution. If taxes were the distributive tool, the tension would work
through incentives. In our model, however, the only distributive tool is migration, and
the tension works through the spillover mechanism that induces increasing returns to
scale through G:
1. Eﬃciency requires that production be segregated geographically. This is the
content of Proposition 1.
2. The only way to redistribute income in this model is through migration, which
requires that we mix people of diﬀerent human capital levels.
Eﬃciency and redistribution are always in conﬂict, and this may lead migration to
sometimes be zero in spite of the planner’s desire to redistribute.
Let M (h) be the world’s distribution of human capital, and assume that
G(h)=h
α. (2)






Proof. Suppose that there is a location in the world where people are heteroge-
neous in h. Let the distribution at that location have measure µ(h),w i t hm e a n¯ h.






8Another argument for the negative welfare eﬀects of immigration from the host country perspec-
tive is given by Lundborg and Segestrom (2002) in the context of a quality ladder model of growth.
They show that while under some calibrations immigration may increase R&D and the growth rate
in the host country by depressing wages, proﬁts may nonetheless decline because of the aggregate



















where the inequality follows because dµ/
R
dµ is a measure adding up to unity, and





and the inequality is strict if the support of µ has more than one point. Therefore no
location can have heterogeneity of h.
This proposition suggests that there should be no mixing of skill levels through
migration if the sole objective is to maximize world output. Obviously, the world is
fairly segregated by skill. “Social justice” however could be attained without moving
people around and, instead, by world-wide redistribution, i.e., foreign aid. Unfortu-
nately extensive foreign aid programs, even though substantial and well-intentioned
(2.3 trillion over the last ﬁve decades), have failed to alleviate poverty or to raise
the standards of living in many of the poor nations. Easterly (2006) documents how
the misdirection and mismanagement of foreign aid, due to perverse incentives and
insuﬃcient knowledge of local conditions, have resulted in waste rather than the relief
of poverty. Therefore we focus on immigration as a means to achieve redistribution
and social justice.




On its own, the free mobility of capital will not solve the problem faced by the social
planner if, as Lucas (1990) claims, inequality originates in skill diﬀerences. The group
eﬀect makes factor prices proportional to G,s ot h a tt h e yd i ﬀer across geographic
locations. Unlike the Hecksher-Ohlin model, factor prices can no longer be equalized
via a ﬂo wo fc a p i t a lo rg o o d sa l o n e .P e o p l em u s tm o v es oa st oe q u a l i z e¯ h.9
9In a standard two country, two factor (say human capital and labor) Hecksher-Ohlin model
with constant returns in production, no group eﬀects, and where people move with their human
capital, Benhabib (1996) shows that if policies are skill-blind, or if populations are homogeneous
with respect to their human-capital-to-labor ratio within the countries but diﬀer across countries,
the agent with average human capital to labor ratio in the high-average-skill country prefers to let
everyone in. Since the argument is symmetric, the agent with the average labor to human capital in
the low average skill country also prefers to let everyone in. Thus both of the average agents prefer
full immigration. Putting the two points together, and noting that countries initially diﬀer only in
average human capital to labor ratios, for any pair of social welfare weights applied to the average
agents in each country, the optimal policy is to move all agents to one of the countries. This also
demonstrates that in such a model there is no tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and social welfare, and
optimal immigration is full immigration.
53 Case 1: Two homogeneous countries
So far we have talked of an arbitrary number of locations, but now we specialize to
two locations, or “countries”, i = A,B, with skill levels hA and hB.T h ep o p u l a t i o n
of A is normalized to 1, and the population of B to n. In each country there is just
one productive input, human capital. In this situation, proposition 1 says that before
migration we have eﬃciency. Migration, if any, occurs before production takes place.
E a c ha g e n tw o u l dw i s ht ob ew h e r eG is higher, since then his total wages would be
higher there.
Let x denote the probability that a B-native will be allowed to move to A.W e
shall refer to x as the migration rate, and we denote the average post-migration h




, and ¯ hB = hB.( 3 )
Social welfare function and the planner’s problem.–The planner is a Stackelberg
leader. He announces a policy at the outset, and agents then choose their migration
decisions and production takes place. Let θ and (1 − θ) denote the welfare weights
that the planner assigns to utilities of the residents of A and B, respectively. He then





























U (c)=l nc (4)




and gB =l n G(hB), the problem boils down to




+( 1− θ)n[xgA (x)+( 1− x)gB] (5)
subject to (3). The ﬁrst-order condition is
W
0 (x)=( θ +[ 1− θ]nx)g
0
A +( 1− θ)n(gA − gB)=0 , (6)
Then
W
00 (x)=( θ +( 1− θ)nx)g
00












θ +( 1− θ)nx
. (7)
T h eA p p e n d i xp r o v e st h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t :
6Figure 1: The bang-bang policy in (z,θ) space
Lemma 1 For any α>0 in (2),n>0 and θ ∈ (0,1), if (6) holds, then (7) also
does.
This result implies that the planner’s problem cannot have an interior maximum.
Rather, the planner’s maximum is at a corner: Either x =0or x =1 .
Characterizing the bang-bang solution for x.–Deﬁne the initial, date-zero produc-
tivity of a B-native relative to that of an A-native by




The optimal policy depends on how backward B is relative to A in terms of skills,
and it also depends on n — the population of B relative to A. The following result,
proved in the Appendix, is that the form of the optimal policy does not depend on
α:












We plot the indiﬀerence locus for n =1and n =1 0in Figure 1.
The planner is more inclined to a policy of immigration if B is poor, and if B
is large in terms of population, though the latter is not a quantitatively important
consideration. In the plot, the action x =0is preferred in the North-East quadrant
7and x =1is preferred in the South-East quadrant. So, the planner chooses maximal
immigration if he cares enough for B (low value of θ), and if B is poor enough (low
value of z)a n di fB is large (high values of n). Empirically, z =0 .1 is a good
approximation to the average non-OECD income, which means, for n =1 , (since in
fact x is close to zero) that θ ≥ 3/4.
The lesson of this ﬁgure is that the “world’s planner,” if she exists, does not care
much for B. Freedberg and Hunt’s (1995) numbers tell us that we are, eﬀectively, in
the x =0region. But, since z must be rather small — say 1/10 — the action x =0
is optimal only if θ is at least 0.8. In other words, this outcome we now have is
incompatible with even approximately equal weights in the social welfare function.
4 Case 2: Two heterogeneous countries
We now assume that skills are heterogeneous in both countries. In general, the world’s
planner may wish to make immigration policy biased toward some groups in B,b u t
within those groups she may impose neutrality — everyone within a group may then
face the same probability of moving from B to A. This subsection poses the problem
at this full level of generality.10
Let µA be the pre-migration mean skills in country A and let the human capital
of A’s residents be distributed h ˜ FA (h). Let µB be the mean skills in country B
and let the human capital of B’s residents be distributed h ˜ FB (h), with density
function fB(h). Let
x = φ(h)
be the probability that a type-h resident of B will be allowed to emigrate to A. That
is, φ : R → [0,1].
A skill-neutral policy is one in which φ is a constant, independent of h. Policies
that are not skill neutral are skill biased. Generalizing their deﬁnitions in (3) second
10The U.S. today follows a mixture of skill-biased policies and skill-neutral policies based on
four principles: The reuniﬁcation of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the
protection of refugees, and the diversity of admissions by country of origin. While special legislation
now allows for special consideration for medical professionals for example, the majority of legal im-
migrants enter the US through the family-reuniﬁcation program. While Canadian policy also allows
immigration based on family reuniﬁcation, preferences stress skills and youth: During 1990—2002,
65 per cent of permanent immigrants to the United States were admitted under family preferences.
In Canada, the equivalent proportion was 34 per cent (International Migration and Development:
Regional Factsheet, The Americas, http://www.un.org/migration/presskit/factsheet_america.pdf).
Similarly Australia heavily emphasizes skills and youth in its preference system for
immigrants. See for example http://www.workpermit.com/australia/australia.htm.
Recently France has also moved towards a skill biased immigration policy: see
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Backgrounder2_France.php









and in B it is
¯ hB =
R
h[1 − φ(h)]dFB (h) R
[1 − φ(h)]dFB (h)
. (10)




























subject to (9) and (10).
4.1 The optimal policy
The rest of the paper will assume that µA >µ B,t h a th has no upper bound in the
supports of FA and FB, and that (4) holds. In this case, the optimal policy generally is
skill-biased, and of the “bang-bang” type in the sense that within a group indexed by
h, either everyone should migrate or no one should do so. Moreover, the set of types
is connected in the sense that if type h0 is allowed to migrate, then either everyone
with h below h0 is also allowed to migrate, or everyone above h0 is allowed to migrate.
The ﬁrst policy we call “skimming from the bottom” of the FB distribution; under
that policy there exists a cutoﬀ, ˜ h, such that
φ(h)=
½
1 for h<˜ h
0 for h>˜ h
(12)
The second “skimming from the top,” or simply a “brain-drain” policy:
φ(h)=
½
0 for h<˜ h
1 for h>˜ h
(13)





the planner being, in both cases, indiﬀerent about whether ˜ h should migrate or not.
The rest of this section will prove the following properties of the optimal policy
1. Whenever immigration is positive, it is always skill biased,
2. For θ suﬃciently close to unity, the policy is of the form (13),
3. For θ<1
2,t h ep o l i c yi so ft h ef o r m( 1 2 ) ,a n d
4. For some θ’s satisfying 1
2 <θ<1, the optimal policy may involve no migration.
9The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving these claims. Before reading
the proof, it is instructive to consider the special case when FA and FB are both
log-normal as in Figure 3. The region of h-values for which φ =1is then the purple-
shaded area in Figure 5. We now turn to the proof of proposition 2 and begin with
the following lemma.












subject to (9) and (10), where
θ
∗
A = θ +( 1− θ)ωn, θ
∗
B =( 1− θ)n(1 − ω),a n dω ≡
Z
φ(h)dFB.
Proof. Substituting for U and leaving out terms that do not depend on φ,( 1 1 )
reads
θlnGA +( 1− θ)n
Z
{φ(h)(gA + h)+( 1− φ[h])(gB + h)}dFB
= θlnGA +( 1− θ)n
Z
{φ(h)gA +( 1− φ[h])gB}dFB +( 1− θ)n
Z
hdFB.
But the last terms does not depend on φ and we are left with (14).
Assume that the density fB exists for all h,a n dd e ﬁne
z(h)=nfB(h)φ(h)
to be the new control variable that satisﬁes z(h): R → [0,n f B(h)] for all h.I n















, and nω ≡ Z =
Z
z (h)dh.
The constraint set for z is convex. We attach the multiplier λ0 to the non-negativity
constraint, and the multiplier λ1 to the upper-bound constraint. The planner faces
the Lagrangean
L = W +
Z






= λ1 (h) − λ0 (h). (15)
where ∂W
∂z(h) is evaluated at the optimal policy, the latter consisting of an entire func-





< 0= ⇒ λ0 (h) > 0 and φ(h)=0
> 0= ⇒ λ1 (h) > 0 and φ(h)=1 . (16)
10Now let ¯ nA =1+nω be the post-immigration population of A and ¯ nB = n(1 − ω)










¯ nB +( 1− θ)
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g(¯ hA) − g(¯ hB)
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where the second equality follows because g(h)=αlnh and g0(h)=α/h,a n dw h e r e
m ≡






∂z(h) is linear in h,11 which immediately shows that either (12) or (13) must
hold, though possibly with ˜ h =0or ˜ h =+ ∞. That is, the policy is always bang-
bang. We now turn to the cases that arise for diﬀerent values of θ. Before proceeding
we assume that that there are enough unskilled people in B so that migration can
equalize the average skills, that is ¯ hA = ¯ hB:
Assumption: There exists an ˆ h<∞ such that
¡¯ hA =
















.( 1 9 )
Since ¯ h = E
³
hB | hB ≥ ˆ h
´





ˆ h − hA
´




ˆ h − hA
´
>
0. The two sides of (19) are continuous, and at any solution the LHS must cut the
RHS from above. Therefore if ˆ h exists, it is unique.
The case θ =1 .–In this case the planner cares only about country A.T h e
following policy is then optimal:
Proposition 3 For θ =1 , the optimal policy is characterized by (13), with ˜ h = ¯ hA.









(h − ¯ hA)
¶
R 0 as h R ¯ hA
and the claim follows.
Concavity of G implies that skill-biased policies help country A less than they harm
country B. In spite of this, the planner would allow some immigration from B to A
even if θ<1 as long as θ is suﬃciently close to 1.W h e nθ =1 , we found that as long
as there are some natives of B with skills exceeding those of the average A-native,
11We plot (17) as a function of h in Figure 4.
11skill-biased immigration policies will always lead to positive immigration ﬂows. By
c o n t i n u i t y ,w ee x p e c tt h i st ob et r u ee v e nf o rs o m eθ<1,a sl o n ga sθ is close enough
to 1.
The egalitarian case θ =0 .5.–Immigration ﬂows from the low-skill low-wage
region B to the high-skill high-wage region A. Now consider the policy that attains
¯ hA = ¯ hB,n a m e l y ,( 1 2 ) ,w i t h˜ h replaced by ˆ h. Evaluated at ¯ hA = ¯ hB,( 1 7 )r e a d s
∂W
∂z(h)
= α(1 − θ)
∙

















because when θ =0 .5, we have m =1 . This proves the following result:12
Proposition 4 For θ =0 .5, the policy (12), with ˜ h = ˆ h as deﬁned in (19) is optimal.
Furthermore the skill level of the marginal immigrant, hm = ¯ hA = ¯ hB. This is a skim-
the-bottom policy: Only the less-skilled are allowed emigrate.
The case θ<0.5.–In this case the planner cares more for B. The following result
is proved in the Appendix:




, there exists a unique optimal policy of
the form (12) with ˜ h = ˜ h∗ < ˆ h.M o r e o v e r ,θ<1









We illustrate Propositions 4 and 5 with a calibrated example below. In that
example it will be seen that the restriction made in Proposition 5 that ˜ h∗ ≤ ˆ h is in
fact not binding. This is seen by comparing the ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 with the third
panel. In the third panel we see that ¯ hA and ¯ hB (intersect at ˆ h ≈ $12,000,w h e r e a s
in the top panel we see that ˜ h∗ never reaches $7000.





is not covered by the above analysis. Our simulated
example shows that there may be θs in that region such that there is no immigration
whatsoever: On the one hand, allowing a skilled marginal immigrant would, for those
θs, not beneﬁtt h en a t i v e so fA suﬃciently to oﬀset the negative brain-drain eﬀect.
On the other hand, allowing an unskilled immigrant to emigrate from B does not
generate enough beneﬁtt oo ﬀset the negative externality in A through the lower ¯ hA.
12We assumed in our model that migration ﬂows from B to A. However when θ =0 .5 it is possible
to equalize skill levels between A and B with a policy where the most skilled emigrate from A to
B. This is because with θ =0 .5 a n dw i t hr e g i o n sA and B identical except in their initial average
skills, emigration policies that equalize skill levels are optimal, irrespective of who moves. When
θ 6=1 , we have symmetry breaking, as illustrated by the case θ =1where only zero immigration
ﬂows are optimal, b e c a u s ew ec a r ed i ﬀerentially about the residents of A and B. Symmetry breaking
will also hold for the case θ<0.5 studied below.
12Figure 2: The world income distribution in 2000
5 Calibration and simulation
We now wish to illustrate the optimal policy for various hypothetical values of θ,a n d
for realistic FA and FB. We choose “country A” to be the OECD which we shall think
of as the developed world. “Country B” will then be the rest of the world. Sala-i-
Martin (2006) reports the world distribution in the year 2000, and how it comprises
the distributions of income in individual countries. We reproduce these distributions
in Figure 2, which shows them to be roughly log-normal in form.
We observe the distribution of income y for each citizen, which we approximate
as follows by a log-normal distribution:
µOECD(logy)=l n2 0 ,000, σOECD(logy)=l n2
µRest(logy)=l n2 ,000, σRest(logy)=l n2 .5
These are portrayed in Figure 3. The following equation identiﬁes ¯ h:
E (y)=e x p ( µ + σ
2/2) = G(¯ h)E (h)=¯ h





To infer the human capital, h, of a citizen with income y,w ei n v e r tt h ee q u a t i o n
y = G(¯ h)h = ¯ hαh to get h = y¯ h−α, i.e., lnh =l ny − αln¯ h
Figure 4 plots the RHS of the FOC (17) at the status-quo point at which Z =0 ,
i.e. the point at which there is no migration. The vertical axis measures the marginal
beneﬁt of allowing a migrant in; the beneﬁt depends on the migrant’s level of h.T h e
ﬁgure shows that for some values of θ — say around θ =0 .8, the marginal beneﬁto f
migration is negative at all levels of migration. Because the ﬁrst-order condition is
13Figure 3: Calibrated distributions of A and B
Figure 4: The first-order condition at the status quo
14linear in h, the gain to migrating a worker of type h is either decreasing or increasing
in h depending on the sign of θ
¯ hA − 1−θ
¯ hB .




≈ 0.88 in the calibrated example,
where BD is for brain-drain: If (as is the case in this calibration) FB has unbounded
support, then for any θ>θ BD,s o m ev e r ys m a r tB-people should go to A, and there
will be a brain drain.
The skim-the-bottom region of θ ∈ [0,θ SB].–There is another threshold, call it
θSB,b e l o ww h i c hc o u n t r yA will only receive low-h types. Suppose that the lowest
level of h in the support of FB is zero (as, again, is the case in the calibration). Then





where C =l n ( ¯ hA/¯ hB). This is also apparent in Figure 4 in which the FOC for θ =0 .7
barely crosses the zero axis in the neighborhood of zero.
The inaction region θ ∈ (θSB,θ BD).–In this region, eﬃciency losses stemming
from the mixing (see Proposition 1) overwhelm the redistributive gains. It is not




it would reduce G
¡¯ hB
¢
by too much. At these intermediate θ’s, it is not that the
planner does not value the A-natives; he simply values the B-natives too much to
allow a brain drain from B to occur.
The optimal policy.–The optimal policy is described in Figure 5. The purple
area is the set of people who can move under the optimal policy. The vertical axis in
Panel 1 measures G(µA)h, the wage that a migrant of type h w o u l de a r ni nc o u n t r y
A assuming that no one else was allowed to move so that average skills in A were at
their pre-migration (i.e., current) level of µA.F o rθ ≤ 0.71, the unskilled B-natives
migrate to A,a n df o rθ ≥ 0.89, the skilled B-natives migrate. In between, migration
is zero.
T h en u m b e r sm o v i n ga r eh u g e .A tθ =0 .5,m o r et h a nh a l fo ft h eB-natives would
optimally be moved to A. By comparison, the numbers migrating at high levels of θ
a r et i n y—n o tm u c hm o r et h a nt h et o pp e r c e n t i l eo fh in country B would be allowed
to migrate when θ =1 .
6T h e e ﬀect of immigration on the skill premium
To check the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the introduction of a second
skill and physical capital, we now assume that there are two skills and two tasks, task










15Figure 5: The optimal policy
16where G is the same as before, K is capital, and where Hi is the total amount
employed of skill i. Given the Cobb-Douglas nature of production, K will aﬀect the
level of wages, but not the skill premium.
We suppose that each person has two skills: A person of type h has an amount
h1 = h
o ft y p e - 1s k i l l ,a n da na m o u n t
h2 = h − ε.
of type-2 skill.
Comparative advantage.–The ratio of type-2 skill to type-a skill, h2
h1 =1− ε
h,i s
increasing in h, which means that in equilibrium the high-h people will opt to work in
task 2, and that low-h people will opt to work in task 2. Let hm denote the marginal




hdFB (h) and H2 (hm,F B)=
Z ∞
hm
(h − ε)dFB (h)
respectively. Let the two skill prices, i.e., the two wages per eﬃciency unit, be w1
and w2. Let us suppose that there is an agent with skill level hm who is indiﬀerent
between the two occupations. Such indiﬀerence implies that the agent’s income in
t h et w oo c c u p a t i o n si st h es a m e :
w1hm = w2 (hm − ε).








For a person with an arbitrary skill-level h, then, we can express








Earnings in occupation 2 = w2 (h − ε)
and therefore the ratio of earnings in the two occupations is




h − ε h
hm
½
> 1 if h>h m
< 1 if h<h m
Therefore for every ε, the high-skilled prefer occupation 2 and the low-skilled prefer
occupation 1.
17Letting ε → 0.–As ε → 0,w eh a v e
H1 (hm,F B) →
Z hm
0




Now w1 and w2 will converge to w, given by























That is, as ε → 0, the two wages per unit of skill must become the same, or else
people would not be happy in one of the two occupations. This allows us to solve for




Equivalence to the one-task case without physical capital.–We shall now show
that our results carry over fully to this case. Let H1 + H2 = H be the total stock of













That economy’s output will therefore be




















The wage per unit of skill, is just w = ∂Y
∂H1 = ∂Y
∂H2. Firms still have constant-returns-
to-scale production functions, and they make zero proﬁts. In the long run, if K
adjusts to a world interest rate or to the steady-state rate determined by discounting,
then K is proportional to H and therefore Y is linear in H. Under this assumption
from here on, we can apply our above analysis where Y = ˜ G
¡¯ h
¢
H with no further
changes, so that all our results go through with two tasks and an elastic capital stock.
Skill premia: Pre-migration, short-run, and long-run.–The skill premium in an
economy depends on the distribution of h among its residents — call that F —a n do n




hm hdF.T h e





which is the skill-price ratio. The ratio of the average wages of workers in the high-h





(1 − F [hm])
R hm
0 hdF
18and this is what one would ordinarily call “the” skill premium. Now we shall analyze
the skill premium in A in three situations: (A) before the migration, (B) right after
the migration, and (C) in the long run. The model has no adjustment cost for
moving between countries or for changing jobs, and so the following is meant to be
only suggestive of what may happen to the skill premium if such costs did exist. The
presence of these costs would, however, aﬀect the planner’s policy, complicating the
analysis, and so we leave them out. But we shall imagine that following the migration,
the skill-level of the marginal worker does not change “for a while.”
The pre- and post-migration distribution of h in country A.–The pre-migration









The pre- and post-migration hm in country A.–Denote country A’s pre-migration
marginal worker’s skill by hm,0, and its post-migration marginal worker’s skill by hm,θ.
After the migration, economy A will have distribution ˜ Fθ which, in turn, will dictate
a marginal worker hm,θ. But for a while, the marginal worker remains at hm,0 so that
t h et o t a ls k i l l si nt a s k1a n d2w o u l di nt h es h o r tr u nb e
R hm,0
0 hd ˜ Fθ and
R ∞
hm,0 hd ˜ Fθ,




6=1 , and that workers would
wish to change tasks. In the long run, however, workers would move, the marginal




≡ p(θ) would again equal unity, its
“long-run” level portrayed in Figure 6.
We now make the following calculations, and plot the results in Figure 6:
The pre-migration premium.–We now imagine economy A starts in a state of
equilibrium where all workers are happy in the task they are performing. Then the
pre-migration skill premium is sp(hm,0,F A). We do not plot this quantity because it
can be inferred from the positions of the curves at those values of θ ∈ (0.72,0.85) for
which no migration takes place. The middle panel shows that the pre-migration skill
premium, sp(hm,0,F A), is about 2.5, or 150%.





the steeper of the two curves in the middle panel of Figure 6. It is negatively related
to the skill-level of the immigrant pool. The bulk (but not all) of the premium is
caused by the diﬀerence in the composition of the two skill groups, and not in the




from unity; the latter remains below 1.8 for low θs and above 0.75 for high θs.





again unity, and the entire skill premium now originates in skill diﬀerences between
19Figure 6: T h es h o r t - r u na n dl o n g - r u ne f f e c to nt h es k i l lp r e m i u m





high as 10.5 for low θs, and never gets below 3, even when θ is high.13
7 The price of high morals in A
If people’s skills diﬀer because of poor endowments and not on conscious investment
choices, then a low-skill person is not at fault for not being high skilled. Arguably,
then, a skill-neutral immigration policy is more “just” because it gives every agents
in the poor countries an equal chance to migrate, regardless of his or her skill. The
host country, however, generally prefers to admit high-skilled immigrants. We end
the analysis by asking how much the host country loses by making its immigration
policy skill neutral so that every B-native has the same chance of migrating to A.
In a brain-drain policy, Country A chooses the lowest acceptable level of immigrant
skills. Let γ (hm)=n[1 − FB (hm)] = the number of immigrants when the marginal
immigrant has ability hm. Then Proposition 3 says that the optimal skill-biased
policy yields country A average skill of
¯ h(hm)=
µA + γ (hm)E (hm | h ≥ hm)
1+γ (hm)
Under the skill-neutral policy, by contrast, the mean ability of the immigrants is not
E (hm | h ≥ hm) but µB. If that policy admits the same number of people (i.e., γ (hm)
people), the post-immigration average skills in A would be
H (hm)=
µA + γ (hm)µB
1+γ (hm)
.
Then the price of high morals is then the diﬀerence in the domestic eﬃciency wage
(i.e., the diﬀerence in G) under the two policies:
P (hm) ≡ ¯ h(hm) − H (hm)=
γ (hm)
1+γ (hm)
[E (h | h ≥ hm) − µB] ≥ 0.
If the support of FB (the skill distribution in B)i s[hmin,h max], i.e., a bounded
interval, then P (h) is an inverted-U-shaped curve, starting at zero when h = hmin
and ending at zero when h = hmax. Even some unbounded distributions have this
property as long as the tail is not too thick.
T h ep r i c eo fm o r a l si nt h eP a r e t oc a s e .–This distribution allows us to calculate







13In estimating the elasticity of wages with respect to the ratio of immigrants to natives, Borjas
and Katz (2005) distinguish between the larger short-run eﬀect where the capital stock is assumed
to be ﬁxed, and the smaller long-term eﬀect on wages where capital adjusts.














Figure 7: The price of morals for the Pareto case (20) with hmin=1
in which case E
³


























(h − hmin) ≥ 0.
Figure 7 take the case hmin =1and plot the result for two values of ρ.The bigger is
ρ, the smaller is the advantage of the skill-biased policy. This makes sense because
the variance of the Pareto distribution decreases with ρ, and in the limit, as ρ →∞
all the B-natives become alike. Also, the right tail of the Pareto is thicker for lower
values of ρ.
While skill-neutral policies sound good “in principle,” they do not maximize wel-
f a r e . E v e ni fm i g r a t i o ni st h eo n l yr e d i s t r i b u t i v et o o l—a n dt h a ti sw h a tw eh a v e
been assuming in this paper — skill-biased policies do better for the natives of the
host country.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Egalitarian optimal immigration policy from the world perspective, taking into ac-
count the economic costs of immigration to the host and source countries, may still
require a signiﬁcant and abrupt relaxation of the restrictive immigration policies cur-
rently imposed by the rich countries. With increasing globalization, the third world
countries are likely to acquire a greater voice and request greater access to world
labor markets. It will probably become harder for richer countries to justify their
non-discriminatory and redistributive welfare policies at home, while denying access
to their labor markets to citizens of poorer countries, basing the exclusion simply on
22ethnicity and nationality14. While the deep contradictions between the democratic
values of the West and the limitations on free access to world labor markets based
on nationality have only recently began to surface, they are likely to become in-
creasingly apparent in the future, and enter political discourse through international
organizations like the UN or the World Bank. Political negotiations and compromises,
however, may at best yield a gradual relaxation of restrictions on labor mobility, as
in the case of a slowly expanding EU or the phased legalization of illegal immigrants
in the US, rather than an abrupt switch to free immigration that an egalitarian
parametrization of our model suggests.
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9 Appendix
9.0.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof consists of showing that if (6) holds, then (7) also does. Since gA =








































































































































































































































































































































































or, if we write A = 1
(1+nx) and B = 1
(z−1+nx),t o



















The LHS and RHS are both zero at y =1 . Therefore it’s enough to show that the
ﬁr s td e r i v a t i v eo ft h eL H Si sm o r ep o s i t i v et h a nt h eﬁrst-derivative of the RHS for































So, we need to show that (y +1 )
2 > 4y, or that y2+2y+1> 4y, or that y2+1> 2y.
N o w ,t h eL H Sa n dt h eR H Sb o t he q u a l2w h e ny =1 , but the derivative of the LHS,
2y,a l w a y se x c e e d st h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h eR H S .T h e r e f o r e( 7 )h o l d s .¥
9.0.2 Proof of Proposition 2






1+n )+nlnz.W es h a l l
n o ws h o wt h i si ss o .T h i si st h ec u r v ei n(θ,z)-space at which the expression (5) is


























= ¯ hα.T h e n f o r x =0 ,G= hα, G∗ =
¡¯ hB






















































from which the claim follows.
279.0.3 Proof of Proposition 5
















˜ h hdFB (h)
















Since the policy (12) is indexed by a single number, the critical bound, ˜ h,w ec a n




, i.e., as a function of the real number ˜ h alone. Now,




nfB (h) for h<˜ h
0 for h>˜ h


















































. Taken together, (i) and (ii) will
imply that the optimal policy is (12).
(i) Note that ¯ hA (0) = µA, ¯ hB (0) = µB,a n dQ(0) =
µA
µB > 1. From (18), at ˜ h =0 ,
m = θ
1−θ ≤ 1.T h e r e f o r e
∂W
∂z(h)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
h=˜ h=0






















θ +( 1− θ)n
(1 − θ)(1+n)
½
=1 if θ =0 .5
< 1 if θ<0.5 ,
28∂W
∂z(h)












(m − 1) =
½
0 if θ = 1
2
< 0 if θ<1
2








crosses zero at least once.













.W ec a nw r i t e
∂W
∂z(h)







































































We have θ<0.5. Recall that Z =



































































































































































































29Now, at the optimum, ¯ hB − ˜ h>0, 1 −
˜ h
¯ hA > 0, and m −
¯ hB
¯ hA < 0. Since
d¯ hA









∂˜ h < 0, which means that there can be at most one crossing of




, which we denote as ˜ h∗.
30